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Abstract. The conventional approach to the online management of distributed systems—
represented by such standards as SNMP for network management, and WSDM for
systems based on service oriented computing (SOC)—relies on the components of
the managed system to cooperate in the management process, by providing the man-
agers with the means to monitor their state and activities, and to control their behavior.
Unfortunately, the trust thus placed in the cooperation of the managed components
is unwarranted for many types of systems—such as systems based on SOA—making
the conventional management of such systems unreliable and insecure.
This paper introduces a radically new approach to the management of distributed
systems, called governance-based management (GBM), which is based on a middle-
ware that can govern the exchange of messages between system components. GBM
has a substantial ability to manage distributed systems, in a reliable and secure man-
ner, even without any trustworthy cooperation of the managed components. And it
can fully incorporate the conventional management techniques wherever such coop-
eration can be trusted. GBM also supports a reflexive mode of management, which
manages the management process itself, making it safer. However, GBM is still a
work in progress, as it raises several open problems that needs to be addressed before
this management technique can be put to practice.
1 Introduction
For a complex, long-lived, distributed system to be dependable it must be managed contin-
uously. That is, the system needs to be monitored on line, in order to detect inefficiencies,
failures, and attacks; and it must be controlled during system operation in order to deal with
the most critical of these problems. The importance of this type of management—to which
we refer as reactive (distinguishing it from another mode of management to be explored in
this paper1—has been well recognized [6,24].
But the reactive management of distributed systems confronts a fundamental impedi-
ment. Namely, the would be managers2 have little, if any, sway over the system components
they need to manage. That is, the actual behavior of these components—which may be dis-
persed all over the Internet—is largely invisible to the managers, and cannot be controlled
by them from afar.
Most, if not all, existing mechanisms for the reactive management of distributed sys-
tems attempt to bypass this basic impediment by relying on the components of the man-
aged system to cooperate in the management process. Namely, the system components are
1 Reactive management also differs from general software management, which involves, testing,
debugging, people management, etc.
2 By “managers” we mean either people, such as operators, or software components designed for
various management tasks.
trusted to provide managers with means to monitor their state and activities, and to control
their behavior. Standards have been developed to facilitate such cooperation by compo-
nents. The first of these standards was SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol)
[7], developed about 20 years ago for the management of networks. An analogous stan-
dard, called WSDM (Web Services Distributed Management) [16], has been devised more
recently for the management of systems based on service oriented computing (SOC). More-
over, the reliance on the cooperation of components is common to most, if not all, recent
approaches to the reactive management of distributed systems. In particular, autonomic
systems [28] have been conceived to be composed of “autonomic components” that are to
be designed in conformance with the policies of the system they are part of. Same is true
for the following attempts: the concept of Self-Managed Systems by Kramer et al. [15]; the
various versions of Policy Based Management (PBM) [8,17]; and several attempts at man-
agement via Computational Reflection [9,1]. Some of these works employ either SNMP or
WSDM standards; other use different types of cooperation.
Unfortunately, the trust thus placed by the conventional management techniques in the
cooperation of the managed components is unwarranted for many types of systems. This is
the case, in particular, for the application layer of many distributed systems whose compo-
nents are highly heterogeneous, and evolving. It is also the case for the emerging loosely
coupled and heterogeneous distributed systems, whose component parts may run on differ-
ent platforms, may be written in different languages, and may be designed, constructed, and
even maintained under different administration domains. The concept of service oriented
architecture (SOA)—which is prevalent in industry and in government, in particular for
the support of virtual organizations (VOs) and grids—represents an outstanding example
of such systems. We refer to these kinds of systems as having an open architecture, or just
being open3, for short. In part, the term “open” reflect the fact that component of such a
system may change dynamically, or leave the system, while new components may be added
to it at any time.
There is little justification for trusting the components of these kinds of systems to
cooperate in their management. Therefore, if the traditional management techniques, which
relies on such cooperation, is applied to open system, it would not be dependable, and
it would be insecure, as we shall argue in Section 2. One clearly needs a very different
approach to the management of such systems.
The thesis of this paper is that a significant part of system management can be accom-
plished via suitable governance of the exchange of messages between system components—
even if none of these components can be trusted to cooperate in the management process.
And that such governance can be done scalabely, and in a dependable and secure manner
by means of an appropriate middleware.
This thesis leads us to the introduction of what we call governance-based management
(GBM) mechanism, which does not depend on the cooperation of the managed compo-
nents, but is able to utilize such cooperation if it is deemed to be trustworthy. Moreover,
the governance of message exchange, on which GBM is based, enables it to manage the
management process itself, thus rendering this process safer—we refer to this important
capability as reflexive management.
GBM is thus strictly more general then the conventional, SNMP-like, management
mechanism, as it can incorporates the latter. Also, GBM has a potential of being more
reliable and more flexible than the conventional management mechanisms. But this paper
3 The term “open system,” as used here, has nothing to do with the concept of open source.
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is only the first step in the creation of GBM. It present the idea of GBM, which constitute a
radical departure for the SNMP-like management, and its general architecture. But this idea
raises several problems, which are still open and require further research, and it requires
rigorous experimental validation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the conventional ap-
proach to system management, and discusses its limitations. Section 3 describes the gist
of our approach to system management. Section 4 discusses the properties of the middle-
ware which are required for it to be able to support GBM; and provides a brief introduction
to the law-governed interaction (LGI) middleware, which satisfies these properties, and
which we employ for this purpose. Section 5 introduces a generic framework for GBM.
Section 6 describes a simple case study, of supermarket chain managed via GBM—it is a
partial description of an actual implementation of such a system, and of its management
via GBM, as a proof of concept of this management mechanism. Section 7 describes part
of what is yet to be done for the vision of GBM, to fulfill its considerable promise. We
conclude in Section ??.
2 The Conventional Approach to System Management, and its
Limitations
To be more specific about the conventional approach to system management, we describe
here broadly the WSDM standard for the management of SOA-like systems. Under this
standard each managed component, or service4, is expected to provide what we call a man-
agement interface (MI) (it is called “management agent” in WSDM). The MI is supposed
to provide managers with means for getting information about the state and behavior of the
component, and means for controlling it. These means are called managerial capabilities,
and they are classified into three types: (1) properties of the component, which managers
may examine; (b) events that occur at a component, which the component itself would com-
municate to the managers that subscribed to them; and (c) operations that managers may
invoke by sending specified kinds of messages to a component, to control it.
A distinction is made between component-specific capabilities; and common capabili-
ties that need to be provided uniformly by all components, or by a substantial subset of them
[16]. For example, the component-specific capabilities provided by the MI of a printer may
include properties such as toner, that represents the current toner capacity of the printer,
and printTime that represents the average time it took this printer to report back that
a print request has been served; and operations such as closeQueue that blocks new
printing requests from being accepted by the printer. Common capabilities may include
properties such as CPU utilization and inflow, which represents the number of
messages that arrived at any given component during a specified window of time; and op-
erations such as remove, which would remove the given component from the system.
We now identify two types of limitations of the conventional management: (1) conse-
quences of over-reliance on the cooperation of the managed components; and (2) the risk
due to the power vested in the managers of a system.
(1) The drawbacks of over-reliance on the cooperation of the managed components: We
maintain that conventional management, which relies on the cooperation of the managed
components, tends not to be dependable and be insecure, when applied to systems whose
4 Although in SOA, the terms “components” and “service” are often used interchangeably, we will
usually use the term “component,” for uniformity with other system types.
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components are not very trusted—like SOA-based systems, and like most systems at their
application level. Moreover, such management tends to be inflexible even when applied to
trusted systems.
(1.a) The lack of dependability: When the code of a component is not trustworthy, be-
cause its code is not known or because it evolves frequently in unpredictable manner, then
the management interface (MI) provided by this component is not likely to be trustwor-
thy either. Note that this is not a serious concern when managing a relatively closed and
stable system. This is also the case for network management (subject to SNMP standard),
because the vendors of hosts, routers, and firewalls—the main manageable components at
the network layer—can usually be trusted to implement the required MIs.
(1.b) The lack of security: It is difficult to protect the MIs of untrusted components
against malicious attacks. This is particularly hard when the components are dispersed all
over the Internet, and are maintained under different administrative domains. Moreover,
one cannot ignore the possibility that the writers of certain components have no interest
in cooperating with the management process, and may thus provide wrong capabilities
intentionally. Consequently, some MIs may be corrupted and would provide managers with
wrong, possibly intentionally misleading, information. And it is obvious that management
based on such information can harm the system being managed.
(1.c) The lack of flexibility: this problem has to do with the common capabilities that
all MIs of a given system are expected to provide. Any change in such capabilities, or any
addition to them, needs to be carried out by each of the heterogeneous system components.
This is a very laborious undertaking, and a very error prone one.
(2) The risk of managerial power: The ability of managers to monitor and control the
system under their care provides them with enormous power with respect to that system.
If left unchecked, such power can be easily abused by careless or malicious managers, or
by a lack of proper coordination between different managers. This is the case whether the
manager is a person—playing the role of sys-admin or of an operator—or if it is a program,
designed to carry out some managerial tasks automatically, perhaps under autonomic man-
agement. Indeed, the harmful effect that operator’s errors often have on the system they
manage is very substantial, as is well known by practitioners, and studied systematic in the
context of web-services [3].
To mitigate such risks, one needs to manage the process of management itself. Such
a reflexive management should entail things like: imposing restrictions on what different
managers can see and do; imposing necessary constraints on the order of operations that
can be carried out by a single manager, or by a group of them; and logging the activities of
managers. It should be pointed out that SNMPv3—the third version of the SNMP standard
for network management—addresses some of these issues via conventional access control.
But such a control is too rudimentary for the task at hand, in particular because it is not
stateful, and not proactive—while both of these feature are critical for imposing constraints
on the order of operations and on coordination between managers.
3 The Gist of our Approach to System Management, and its Rational
As stated in the Introduction, the thesis that underlies our approach to the management of
untrusted distributed systems is that a significant part of such management can be accom-
plished by governing the interaction—via messages exchange—between the components
of a given system, without the need to rely on the cooperation of the managed compo-
nents themselves. This thesis is based, in part, on the observation that many, if not most,
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of the WSDM-like capabilities currently used for system management are communication-
based—that is, they can be defined purely in terms of message exchange. For instance,
among the example capabilities mentioned above, the printer’s property printTime and
the operation closeQueue on a printer are of this type; and so are the common property
inflow and the common operation remove. In particular, the remove operation, ap-
plied to a given component, can be carried out by blocking all messages sent to, and by, a
component to be removed, thus effectively separating it from the system. Of course, not all
managerial capabilities are of this type. Some capabilities, such as as the toner property
of a printer, or the CPU utilization property of a host, are defined in term of the in-
ternal state and behavior of a component. Such internal capabilities, must be provided by
the component themselves, if they are to be usable for management.
This thesis is bolstered by the fact that complex societal systems—like states, cities,
enterprises, and vehicular traffic—are managed mostly by observing and governing the
interaction among people, and between them and various inanimate entities (like stopping
at a red light). And this management is largely independent of the internal thoughts and
private behavior of people, which is usually not available to the management of societal
systems.
Based on this thesis, we plan to introduce a mechanism called governance-based man-
agement (GBM), which operates primarily by analyzing and governing the flow of mes-
sages between the distributed components of a system—using a middleware, suitable for
this task. One can distinguish between three functions of GBM, which would be carried out
in a unified manner:
(1) The communication based capabilities would be created under GBM via an analysis
of the flow of messages in the system. This, we maintain, can be done reliably, scalabely,
flexibly and securely.
(2) For internal capabilities, GBM would utilize the conventional management inter-
faces, if they are provided by individual components, and if they are deemed to be trustwor-
thy. And although these two types of managerial capabilities are to be provided in different
ways, they are complementary, and can be used by managers in a similar manner: by send-
ing appropriate messages to individual components.
(3) Reflexive management would be accomplished by regulating the communication of
managers with the components being managed, and with each other.
The Limited Objective of this Paper: The purpose of this paper is to introduce a generic
framework for GBM; a framework that provides necessary conditions for effective man-
agement of open systems. It should be pointed out, however, that these are only necessary
conditions for management. Effective management also requires strategies about what to
monitor and when, and how to respond to system failures. Such strategies are highly appli-
cation dependent, and are beyond the scope of this work, which focuses on general issues
of management of distributed systems.
4 On The Middleware Underlying GBM
Effective governance-based management requires a powerful middleware to be based on,
which can regulate the exchange of messages between the components of an open system.
In particular, this mechanism needs to satisfy the following conditions: (a) it must be state-
ful and proactive, to be able to represent communication based capabilities, and to regulate
coordination between managers; (b) it must be decentralized, for scalability; (c) it must
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itself be dependable and secure, for obvious reasons; (d) it must support multiple policies,
allowing for smooth interoperation between them; and (e) it must provide for policies to be
incrementally composed into what we call conformance hierarchies. (The meaning of, and
reason for, the last two requirements will become evident in due course.)
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Fig. 1. Interaction via LGI: Actors are depicted by circles, inter-
acting across the Internet (lightly shaded cloud) via their private
controllers (boxes), one operating under law L, and the other
under law L’. Agents are depicted by dashed ovals that enclose
(actor, controller) pairs. Thin arrows represent messages, and
thick arrows represent modification of state.
These requirements
are not easy to sat-
isfy, and as has been
demonstrated in [22],
they are largely not satis-
fied by conventional ac-
cess control (AC)—the
currently dominant ap-
proach to governance of
distributed systems. This
is true for contempo-
rary industrial AC mech-
anisms such as Tivoli
and XACML [11]; for
middlewares such as CORBA
and J2EE; as well as for
recent research mech-
anisms such as Oasis
[13], SPL [26], or BAM
[14]. Even Ponder [10],
perhaps the first attempt
to support system man-
agement via governance,
is not suitable for our
purpose. This is, in part,
because Ponder sepa-
rates the support of man-
agement (via its concept
of obligation) from its unstateful treatment of access control, and also because it does not
support conformance hierarchy, which turns out to be essential for flexible management.
For this paper we employ a regulatory mechanism called law-governed interaction
(LGI) [23]. This mechanism, whose prototype has been released for public use, goes well
beyond conventional access control, and it satisfies all the above mentioned requirements,
as has been demonstrated in [22]. The LGI mechanism is outlined below.
4.1 The Law-Governed Interaction (LGI) Mechanism—an Overview
Broadly speaking, LGI is a regulatory mechanism that enables an open and heterogeneous
group of distributed actors to engage in a mode of interaction governed by an explicitly
specified and strictly enforced policy, called the law of this group. By “actor” we mean an
arbitrary process, whose structure and behavior is left unspecified; and an actor engaged in
an LGI-regulated interaction, under a law L, is called an L-agent. LGI thus turns a set of
disparate actors, which may not know or trust each other, into a community of agents that
can rely on each other to comply with the given law L. This is done via a distributed col-
lection of generic components called private controllers, one per L-agent, that are trusted
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to mediate all interaction between these agents, subject to the specified law L (as illustrated
in Figure 1).
All told, LGI goes well beyond conventional access control, in its ability to cope with
the increasing size, openness, and heterogeneity of distributed systems. It is, in particu-
lar, inherently decentralized, and thus scalable even for a wide range of stateful policies.
And it is very general. A prototype of LGI has been recently released, and has a growing
community of users.
This section provides only a very brief overview of LGI, hopefully sufficient for un-
derstanding the gist of this proposal. For more information, the reader is referred to the
LGI tutorial and manual [21], and to a host of published papers—but perhaps the most
approachable text is a recent, and yet unpublished, abstract model of LGI [22].
Agents and their Private Controllers: An L-agent x is a pair x = 〈Ax, TLx 〉, where Ax is
an actor, and TLx is its private controller, which mediates the interactions of Ax with other
LGI-agents, subject to law L. Each controller TLx maintains the control state (or, “cState”)
of agent x, which is some function of the history of interaction of x with other community
members. The nature of this function, and its effect on the ability of x to communicate,
is largely defined by the law L. The concept of law is defined in the following section.
The role of the controllers is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the passage of a message
from an actor Ax to Ay , as it is mediated by a pair of controllers, first by TLx , and then by
TLy —both operating, in this case, under the same law, although interoperability between
different laws is supported by LGI as well. One of the significant aspects of such mediation
is that under LGI every message exchange involves dual control: on the sides of both the
sender of a message, and of its receiver.
It should be pointed out that private controllers are actually hosted by what we call con-
troller pools—each of which is a process of computation that can operate several (typically
several hundreds) private controllers, thus serving several different agents, possibly subject
to different laws. (Henceforth we will often refer to controller pools as “controllers,” ex-
pecting the resulting ambiguity to be resolved by the context.) The set of controller-pools
available to a given application (or a set of application) is called a controller service or
CoS. Interestingly, as we have shown in [23], the use of duel controllers actually reduces
the overhead of mediation for communication over WAN—contrary to what one could have
expected.
The Concept of Law Under LGI: An LGI law (or, simply, a law) is defined in terms of
three elements: (a) a set E of regulated events; (b) a set O of control operations; and (c)
the control-state (CSx) associated with each agent x. More specifically, E is the set of
events—such as the sending and arrival of a message—that may occur at any agent, and
whose disposition is subject to the law. O is the set of operations that can be mandated by
a law, to be carried out at a given agent, upon the occurrence of regulated events at it. In a
sense, these operations constitute the repertoire of the law—i.e., it is the set of operations
that the law is able to mandate. This set includes operations like forwarding a message,
and updating the state of a given agent. Finally, the control-state, or simply the state, of
an LGI agent is the state maintained by the controller of this agent, which is distinct from
the internal state of its actor. This state, which is initially empty, can change dynamically
in response to the various events that occur at it, subject to the law under which this agent
operates.
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Now, The role of a law under LGI is to decide what should be done in response to the
occurrence of a regulated event at an agent operating under this law. This decision, which
is called the ruling of the law, consists of a sequence of zero or more control operations
from the set O. More formally, a law is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (law). Given a set E of all regulated events, a set O of all control operations,
and a set S of all possible control-states, a law L is a function: L : E × S → O∗
In other words, a law maps every possible (event, state) pair into a sequence of zero
or more control operations, which constitute the ruling of the law.
Note that this definition does not specify a language for writing laws. This for several
reasons: First, because despite the pragmatic importance of choosing an appropriate law-
language, this choice has no impact on the semantics of the model itself, as long as the
chosen language is sufficiently powerful to specify all possible functions of the form of
Definition 1. Second, by not specifying a law-language we provide the freedom to employ
different law-languages for different applications domains, possibly under the same mech-
anism. Indeed, the implemented Moses mechanism employs two different law-languages,
one based on the logic-programming language Prolog, and the other based on Java.
On the Basis for Trust Between Members of a Community: For an L-agent x to trust its
interlocutor y to observe law L, it is sufficient for x to have the assurance that the following
three conditions are satisfied: (a) the exchange between x and y is mediated by correctly
implemented private controllers Tx and Ty, respectively; (b) both controllers operate under
law L; and (c) the L-messages exchanged between x and y are transmitted securely over
the Internet.
The first of these conditions is the hardest to satisfy, and its support is one of the main
goal of this project. The other two condition are straightforward. To ensure condition (b),
that is that the interacting controllers Tx and Ty operate under the same law, LGI adopts
the following protocol: When forwarding a message, a controller, say Tx, appends to it a
one way hash H of its law. The controller of the interlocutor, Ty in this case, would accept
this as a valid L-message only if H is identical to the hash of its own law. Of course, such
an exchange of hashes of the law can be trusted only if condition (a) is satisfied. Finally, to
ensure the validity of condition (c), above, the messages sent across the Internet—between
actors and their controllers, and between pairs of controllers—should be digitally signed
and encrypted. These conventional, but rather expensive, measures have not been employed
in the current implementation of LGI. They are to be addressed under this project.
The Local Nature of LGI Laws, and their Global Sway: Our concept of law differs struc-
turally from the conventional concept of AC policy, as discussed in [22]. One important
characteristic of LGI laws is that they are inherently local. Without going into technical
details, locality means that an LGI law can be complied with, by each member of the com-
munity subject to it, without having any direct information of the coincidental state of other
members. This locality is a critical aspect of LGI for two major reasons: First, because lo-
cality is necessary for decentralization of law enforcement, and thus for scalability even for
stateful policies. And second, because locality facilitates interoperability between different
laws, and enables the construction of law-hierarchies, as has been shown in [2].
Remarkably, although locality constitutes a strict constraint on the structure of LGI
laws, it does not reduce their expressive power, as has been proved in [21]. In particu-
lar, despite its structural locality, an LGI law can have global effect over the entire L-
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community—mostly because all members of that community are subject to the same law—
and can, thus, be used to establish mandatory, community wide, constraints.
The Organization of Laws into Conformance Hierarchies: LGI enables its laws to be
organized into what we call conformance hierarchies. Each such hierarchy, or tree, of laws
t(L0), is rooted in some law L0. Each law in t(L0) is said to be (transitively) subordinate
to its parent, and (transitively) superior to its descendants. And, given a pair of lawsN and
M in t(L0), we write N≺M if N is subordinate toM. Semantically, the most important
aspect of this hierarchy is that if N≺M then N conforms to M, in the sense that law N
satisfies all the stipulations of its superior lawM.
This is a much more general concept of conformance than adopted by some policy
mechanisms (see [10], for example), where a policy P is considered in conformance with a
policy Q, only if P is at least as restrictive as Q. Briefly, the LGI’s concept of conformance
hierarchy has two key properties: (a) it is heterogeneous, and (b) it is enforced. The hierar-
chy is heterogeneous with respect to conformance, in the following sense: every law in the
hierarchy can specify the degrees of freedom it leaves to its subordinate (descendant); that
is, each law circumscribes the degree and manner in which its descendant can deviate from
it. And the hierarchy is enforced by its very construction. That is, the very definition of a
law N as subordinate to M, prevents N from violating the restriction imposed by M on
its subordinates. The manner this is done has been defined in [2], and it is too complex to
describe here.
Other Features of LGI, and its Performance: We will list here some of the notable fea-
tures of LGI, which we were not able to discuss in this short overview, and will provide
references to them for the interested reader. These features are: (1) the concept of enforced
obligation, that provides LGI with important proactive capabilities; (2) the treatment of
exceptions, which provides LGI with fault tolerance capabilities; (3) the treatment of cer-
tificate, which is obviously necessary for the regulation of distributed computing; and (4)
interoperability between different laws. All these are discussed in the LGI Manual [21].
Finally, we point out that the performance of LGI is discussed in [21]. In a nutshell, the
overhead due to the LGI mediation is between 30 and 100 microseconds, for the types of
laws we used in most of our studies.
5 A generic Framework for Governance-Based Management
A system managed under GBM (called GBMS) is defined here as a four-tuple 〈B,M, T, LE〉,
where B is the base system being managed, also called the base layer (or B-layer) of the
GBMS; M is the managing system, also called the management layer (or M-layer) of the
GBMS; LE is an ensemble of laws, organized into a conformance hierarchy, that collec-
tively enables the management of the system; and T is a set of LGI controllers, trusted
to serve as the middleware underlying this mechanism. It should be pointed out that this
framework assumes that the base system is constructed from scratch to be managed under
GBM. Applying GBM to legacy systems is still an open problem, to be addressed in the
future (cf., Section 7.
We now elaborate on this definition of GBMS by describing the following aspects of
it: (a) the general anatomy of a GBMS; (b) the structure of the hierarchical law-ensemble,
which is, in a sense, the heart of the GBM framework; (c) the deployment of a GBMS; (d)
its operation; and (e) its evolution.
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Fig. 2. A Framework for Governance-Based Management
(a) The Anatomy of a GBMS: The structure of a GBMS is depicted in Figure 2. We intro-
duce here the various parts of this structure, and describe their roles in the management pro-
cess. First, the active building blocks of the base and management layers are autonomous
entities we call actors, which are treated essentially as black boxes under GBM. The ac-
tors B are the components that comprise the system to be managed, and are represented in
Figure 2 by irregular shapes, which represents their presumed heterogeneity. Some, but not
necessarily all, such components would have a WSDM-like management interfaces (MI)
provided by them, which are represented in Figure 2 by triangles at their top. The proposed
mechanism would utilize such interfaces, when they are available and considered trustwor-
thy, but it does not require that all components, or any of them, provide such interfaces.
Note that the internal capabilities of a component c that does not provide an MI, or whose
MI is not considered trustworthy enough to be used, cannot be used for the management of
c, but c can still be managed via its communication-based capabilities defined for it by the
law ensemble.
The actors in M are either people (say administrators or operators) that operate through
software interfaces.; or they are software components that do such things as log various
events and analyze them. This framework makes no distinction between these two kind of
actors, referring to both of them as “managers.”
Every actor in either B or M is associated with a controller (depicted by a box in Fig-
ure 2), that operates under one of the laws in the hierarchical law-ensemble LE. Each such
controller mediates the interaction of the actor it serves with the rest of the system, subject
to the law under which this actor operates. And, as we shall see below, the controller serving
a component of B plays an analogous role to that of the traditional management interface
(MI) with respect to what we have called communication-based capabilities. Moreover, this
controller mediates the interactions between managers and the MI of of the, if any.
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Finally, we distinguish between two types of messages: (1) base-messages, or b-messages
(depicted by solid lines in Figure 2), are those exchanged between base components via
their corresponding controllers; and (2) management messages, or m-messages (depicted
by dashed lines in Figure 2), are those exchanged between managers via their controllers,
or between managers, via their controllers, and the controllers of B-components (generally
not involving the components themselves).
(b) The Hierarchical Law Ensemble (LE) of a Managed System: We introduce here an
informal, and rather schematic, description of the law ensemble, which is based on the
concept of conformance hierarchy briefly discussed in Section 4.1, and in more detail in
[2]. Some details about the possible content of such an ensemble are provided in Section 6
in the context of a specific case study.
The law ensemble of a GBMS is organized via the concept of conformance hierarchy
of LGI introduced formally and in details in [2], and described very briefly in Section 4.1,
and utilized in various papers, such as [20], for various application domains. The schematic
structure of this ensemble is depicted in Figure 3. The root of this hierarchy is the law LG,
that governs the entire GBMS, because all other laws in this ensemble are forced to conform
to this law (G stands for “global”). Two laws in LE are directly subordinate to LG. They
are: (a) law LB that govern the B-layer of the system, and (b) law LM that govern the M-
layer. Subordinate to lawLB there is a set of component-lawsLCi , one for each component
Ci in B (three of the components in this figure represent specific B-components of the case
study introduced in Section 6). Note, however, that several components that have the same
API, and require the same management capabilities, can operate under the same law.
It is worth noting that the management of complex systems, such as grids and virtual
organizations (VOs), which may span different administrative domains, is likely to require
deeper law-hierarchies. In particular, law LM may have several sub-laws (as suggested
by the dashed lines in Figure 3), one for each such domain. Similarly Law LB may have
several sub-law, under which different divisions of the software system would operate.
But these are fairly straightforward generalizations of the simplified architecture described
above.
(c) On the Deployment of a System Managed under GBM: Recall that we are assuming
here that the base system is constructed from scratch to be managed under GBM. Under
this assumption—which we plan to drop in in the future by considering incremental de-
ployment, and the management of legacy systems—the deployment of a new GBMS starts
with the following steps, carried out sequentially: (a) creation of a trustworthy controller
service (CoS) (or contracting the use of some public CoS, if there is one); (b) definition of
a root law LG that would govern the entire system; and (c) definition of laws LB and LM ,
subordinate to LG, that would govern the B-layer and the M-layer, respectively.
Once these initial steps are carried out, one can add new components to the B-layer
of the system, incrementally, and at any time. This is done, with an arbitrary component
LCi , by first defining an appropriate law LCi for it, subordinate to LB—such as the law
Lbuyer discussed in Section 6; and then having component Ci adopt a private controller Ti
to mediate its interaction with the rest of the system under this law. As demonstrated in our
case study, a law can be designed such that only specified components can operate under it.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that we have no means for forcing a component of the
base system to operate under any law subordinate to LG, or indeed to employ LGI for
its communication. However, a component that does not satisfy these conditions may be
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barred from communication with any component that does operate under a law subordinate
to LG.
(d) On the Operation of a GBMS: The interactions between a pair of base components
Ci and Cj , is mediated by their respective controllers, subject to laws LCi and LCj , re-
spectively. And each of these laws would take care of the specific management capabilities
defined by it, along with the common capabilities defined by law LB and LG.
But at this point the reader may wander how can such interoperability between agent
operating under different laws (or policies) be accomplished. The conventional answer to
this question—described in [12,4,19,5], in particular5—is that one needs to form a compo-
sition, say LCi,j , of these two laws, and mediate the interaction in question subject to such
composition. But, as shown in [19], such compositions tend to be computationally hard,
even for simple types of policies. And one needs to create a quadratic number—in terms
of the number of B-agents in a given system—of such compositions. This is obviously
impractical.
LCn
...LC1 ...
LM
LG
LB
LbuyerLInM
LBuO ...
Fig. 3. A Basic Hierarchical Law-Ensemble for Governance Based Management
Fortunately, as we have shown in [2], no such composition is required for interoperation
between laws in a hierarchical law-ensemble under LGI. This seamless interoperability is
due basically to two factors. The first is the enforced nature of conformance hierarchy,
which provide the assurance to the two interlocutors, that both operate under the same
superior laws, say LB or even LG. If this common heritage—which us recognizable under
LGI—is sufficient for two laws to interoperate, no seams are needed between them. The
second factor is dual control over every message exchange (as explained in detail in [2]).
(e) On the Evolution of a GBMS: The GBM framework is very flexible with respect to
several types of changes of the system operating under it. In particular, a change of the code
of an existing component leaves the communication-based capabilities invariant, because
they are determined by the law of this component, and not by its code. (Note that, on
the other hand, a change in the code of a component can change its internal capabilities
presented to the manager via its conventional MI; so our claim of flexibility pertains only
to communication based capabilities.)
Second, the law ensemble is flexible with respect to the introduction of new leaf laws
that governs the interactive activities of individual components. Such changes are basically
5 Note that these papers are using the term “policy” for what we call here “laws”.
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local with respect to the law-ensemble,because it cannot effect other laws due to the con-
formance relation underlying the the hierarchical structure of the ensemble.
However, the GBM framework is not yet flexible with respect to certain kind of changes
of its law ensemble. We will take up this issue in Section 7.
6 Managing a Supermarket Chain: A Case Study
Consider a distributed enterprise system that serves a supermarket chain, called Acme,
which is comprised of several branches that include stores and the headquarter. And sup-
pose that this software system consists of loosely-coupled, heterogeneous, and semi-autonomous
components (or services, if Acme is SOA-based). To be a bit more specific suppose that
Acme contains the following three types of software components (one per branch) called:
InM (for “Inventory Monitor”), buyer, and BuO (for “Budget Office”). An InM monitors
the inventory level of the various products in its branch, sending a purchase request to its
branch’s buyer for any product whose inventory is considered too low. The function of
buyer is to procure goods for its branch, in response to the purchase request sent to it by
InM; this is done by sending purchase orders (POs) to various vendors. But a buyer is
supposed to limit its purchases by the budget assigned to it by messages it receives from
the budget office (buO). (We assume that the structure of the message exchanged between
these three components is pre-specified.)
Suppose now that the managerial objectives with respect to these components are roughly
the following: First, to measure the quality of service (QoS) provided by the buyer com-
ponents in all the branches. Second, to detect two kind of possible buyer’s misbehaviors,
and to respond appropriately to them. The misbehaviors in question are: (a) a buyer issues
POs for more money than allowed by its budget; and (b) the buyer purchases products not
requested by the InM component of its branch. We will show now how these objectives,
and others to be discussed below, can be addressed by an appropriate law ensemble. But
due to lack of space, the various laws discussed below are described very broadly, mostly
in terms of the provision made by them, without spelling out the formal laws that estab-
lishes these provisions. The structure of our laws themselves will be illustrated only for a
very simple law segment, which is spelled out in terms of pseudo code that resembles the
Prolog-based law language of LGI. Note also that only some of the following discussion
deals with three components named above, the rest of it deals with the entire Acme system,
and is fairly generic.
The Root Law LG: Being the root of the hierarchical law ensemble of the supermarket
chain, this law governs the system globally, because every law in LE must conform to all
its provisions, which are:
(1) Uniform authentication and identification of Acme’s actors: For an actor to adopt a
controller under any given law L in LE—and thus be able to operate subject to a given
law L as part of Acme—it must certify itself via a certificate signed by a CA specified by
law LG. We assume that each such certificate identifies the name, branch and layer of this
actor; where the name is assumed to be unique for every branch, and the layer identifies the
actor as either a B-agent (i.e., belonging to the base layer) or an M -agent. This identifying
triple would be stored in the state of the controller, and thus serve to identify the agent at
run time. (Note that the GBM framework does not require digital authentications, but it
supports it if it is considered necessary.)
(2) Sender identification: Every message sent by an actor, which is identified by the triple
[name, branch, layer], would be prefixed by this triple. This is necessary for the definition
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of various managerial capabilities at the controller of the receiver of a message, but it would
be removed before the message is delivered to the target actor.
Note that this law provides no managerial capabilities, but it facilitates the introduction
of such capabilities by subordinate laws.
Law LB of the Base Layer: This law has two complementary functions. First, to define a
set of common capabilities, i.e., properties, operations, and events that would be provided
by the controllers of all B-agents, or a substantial subset of them. Second, to define the
purview of the various managers.
(i) Defining common capabilities: We first explain how a capability can be defined by this
law. Consider a property called POcount, which represents the number of POs sent by a
given agent. This property can be defined by the segment of law LB displayed in Figure 4.
This segment consists of two rules R1 and R2, written here in pseudo code, which is
structurally similar to the actual Prolog-based law-language of LGI. The effect of RuleR1
is that any B-agent that sends a purchase order has the POcount variable in the state of its
controller incremented by one, before the message itself is forwarded to its destination. The
effect of Rule R2 is that whenever a message of the form examine(‘‘POcount’’),
sent by a manager, arrives at a B-agent, the current value of the POcount variable would be
forwarded to that manager. In other words, updated by rule RuleR1, to detect misbehaviors
such as number of POs sent exceeds the number of purchase requests.
R1.
UPON sent(M) IF M=PO(...) DO [POcount<-POcount+1, forward]
R2.
UPON the arrival of a message examine(‘‘POcount’’) sent by
a manager DO [forward(POcount) to sender]
Fig. 4. A Segment of Law LB—the POcount property, and its examination
Other common properties can be defined in a similar ways, and common operations
and events can be treated in an analogous manner. For example, an operation remove
can be implemented as follows: (a) B-messages sent or received by a given B-agent x
would be blocked if the value of a variable blocked in the controller of x is 1; (b) the
variable blocked is set to 1 upon the arrival of the message invoke(remove) sent by
a manager. Thus, a component is effectively removed from the system by this command,
by preventing it from communication with other system components.
(ii) Defining the purview of managers: This law can be written to prevent a B-component
at a given branch R from accepting messages from managers not belonging to R.
Law Lbuyer: The function of this law, under which our buyers are to operate, is to imple-
ment its own specific managerial capabilities. This is to be done in a similar manner to the
implementation of common capabilities by lawLB . For example, the following capabilities
can be implemented by this law:
(1) A property budget that represents the balance of the purchasing budget of a given
buyer b. It is to be computed by taking into account the budget-carrying messages sent to b
by the budget server; and the POs actually sent by the buyer.
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(2) A property avDelay that represents the average time difference between the arrival
at b of a purchase request, and the sending of the corresponding PO, or the sending of a
rejection of the request, due, in particular, to lack of sufficient budget. This property could
be used by managers to monitor the quality of service (QoS) provided by the buyer.
(3) An eventlawBudget that occurs at the buyer when its budget balance (i.e., the budget
property above) becomes smaller than a given threshold.
(4) access to conventional MI: If a buyer component has its conventional MI, which
provide some internal managerial capabilities with respect to this components, then this
law can enable the use of these capabilities by managers—as illustrated for component C5
in Figure 2.
Law LM of Managers: This law has two main functions. First, to enable managers to use
the capabilities provided to them by the various B-agents. This is done by enabling agents
operating under this law to send to B-agents at least the following three kinds of messages:
examine(property), invoke(operation), and subscribe(event)—where
the parameters specify the managerial capability being addressed. And note that by lawLB ,
of this example, B-component accept messages only from managers at their own branch.
The second function of this law is to establish reflexive management. In particular, law
LM can force specified types of messages to be logged in a specified audit trail. It can
also establish a way for providing different managers with different roles, and restrict what
agents in each role can do. Moreover, this law can device protocols that managers have to
follow when they interact with each other, which can help them to coordinate their activities
safely.
7 What is Yet to be Done
Although a prototype of GBM has been implemented, and is being tested, there are some
open problems to be solved and engineering work to be carried out, before GBM can be
used for real applications. The following are outlines of some of the issues that need to
be addressed, with some preliminary thought about how they can be approached. The first
subsection below discusses briefly some of the remaining open problems regarding GBM;
and the second subsection addresses the need to validate the efficacy of GBM.
7.1 Open Problems and Potential Extensions
Applying GBM to Legacy Systems So far we have assumed that the base system is con-
structed from scratch to be managed under GBM, requiring all base-components of the
managed system to communicate via LGI, subject to the laws specified for them. To apply
GBM to a legacy system, it has to be done in a manner that does not require the code of
the various components to be even aware of the LGI middleware. A similar task has been
accomplished [25] by a group working on regulating access to file systems via LGI, within
an Intranets. This has been done by intercepting communication by means of firewalls. But
such interception would not be trustworthy for a geographically dispersed system over the
Internet. So, one need a more general solution to this problem.
We already did some preliminary work [18] on one approach to this problem, which
requires a change in the LGI middleware, and has certain drawbacks. Another possible
approach for solving this important problem is based on the following observation6: If we
6 I owe this idea to Dr. Josephine Micallef, from Telcordia Technologies.
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can apply GBM to systems based on Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) principles, then
we can apply it also to any SOA-enabled legacy systems—enabled through the use of facade
patterns that exposes the legacy system capabilities through SOA-based interfaces.
Bootstrapping the Management of the Controllers Used for GBM: It stands to reason
that the set T of controller, which play a central role in the GBM framework, needs to be
managed as well. And it does not seem to make sense to apply GBM for the management
of its own underlying structure. Fortunately there is no need to do so. Because the set
of controllers is stable and completely uniform (even though they tend to operate under
different laws), and can thus be managed reliably as kind of network components in a
SNMP-like manner. To do that one needs to build into the controllers of LGI appropriate
managerial capabilities for managing controllers—both reactively and reflexively. So, the
management of the base layer of a GBMS, and of its set of controllers are to be done in
different ways. But these two types of managements are obviously interrelated, and need
to be integrated—and it is not quite clear how this is to be done.
Dealing with the Evolution of the Law Ensemble of an LGDS: As has been pointed out
in Section 5, it is very easy to add, remove, or change a leaf law of the hierarchical law
ensemble—all these are virtually local changes. But changes of a non-leaf law, such as LG
or LB , are not easy to handle due to their global effect. There are, in fact, two different
problems with such changes, discussed briefly below.
One problem with the changing of non-leaf law, say LG, is the effect that it might have
on the laws subordinate to it. Unfortunately, there is no automatic way for figuring out, in
general, what this effect is, and what to do about it. So, after changing law LG one needs
to reconsider manually each of its subordinate laws. However, it is possible to identify
classes of changes of a non-leaf law that has no effect on its subordinates, or where the
consequence of a change can be handled automatically. The challenge is to identify and
formally characterize such classes, and to develop tools for calculating the effect of change
in non-leaf law on its subordinates.
The second problem with changing non-leaf laws exists in systems that must operate
continuously, and cannot be stopped when laws are being changed. In such systems, a leaf
law must be changed while the system operates—which we call in vivo evolution of the
law (i.e., evolution in a living organism, as it where). This is a particularly hard problem
because of the distributed nature of the LGI middleware. We have recently addressed and
solved this problem for the special case of a system operating under a single law [27]. The
challenge is to extend this solution for the evolution of a whole hierarchical law ensemble.
An Exploration of Managerial Techniques and Patterns: To gain a better understanding
of the potential inherent in GBM, with its unified support for reactive, reflexive modes of
management, it is necessary to explore various managerial techniques and styles. Here we
mention just one such technique, that of that of reconfiguration.
Reconfiguration is a well known and important managerial technique. It is also quite
difficult to accomplish, particularly in a dynamic open system. Indeed, a recent paper about
reconfiguration by Zaras et. al [29] concluded that most current reconfiguration techniques
are being used “in the context of stationary systems, where reconfiguration is centrally
controlled.” They go on to develop a sophisticated reconfiguration technique for a more
dynamic and decentralized context. But, like most current management techniques, this
paper relies on the cooperation of the base components in providing trustworthy manage-
ment interfaces (MIs), and is, therefore, not effective for open systems. Moreover, the Zaras
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paper does not support reflexive mode of management, which is particularly important for
reconfiguration tasks that require synchronized changes in many parts of the systems. Such
tasks often require tight coordination between different managers.
7.2 Experimental Validation of the Efficacy of GBM:
Although GBM has been applied experimentally to a toy system—the basis for the case
study in Section 6—this is far from sufficient for the validation of the efficacy of such a
radically new approach to system management. Such validation requires applying GBM
to a real—or at least realistic—distributed system, and compare this new mode of man-
agement to the conventional management technique, such as under WSDM. This requires
the ability to apply GBM to legacy systems, which is work in progress in our lab. And it
cannot, practically speaking, be done at a university. A plan is under way to conduct such
an experiment in collaboration with Telcordia Technologies, under the leadership of Dr.
Josephine Micallef. But a single experiment of this kind is probably not sufficient for the
validation of GBM, and we hope that the publication of this paper will encourage large
scale experimentation by others.
8 Conclusion
We have introduced in this paper the concept of governance-based management (GBM) for
distributed systems. Besides being more reliable and more flexible than conventional man-
agement techniques, particularly when applied to open systems, it also support a critical
new modes of system management. Namely, beside the conventional reactive management,
GBM supports reflexive management, which controls the management process itself, mak-
ing it safer. Furthermore, GBM can incorporate conventional management standards like
SNMP and WSDM wherever the compliance is deemed trustworthy.
Although an experimental prototype of the proposed GBM mechanism has been imple-
mented, and tested as a proof of concept, there are some open problems to be solved, and
comprehensive testing to be carried out, before GBM can be used for real application. We
have outlined some of the issues that need to be addressed, with some preliminary thought
about possible approach to them.
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